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Abstract
This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third and higherprice auc
tions for a large class of distribution functions of bidders valuations assuming
the symmetric independent private values framework and risk neutrality In
all these auctions equilibrium bids exceed bidders valuations and bidders
raise their bids when one moves to a higher price auction and lower bids when
the number of bidders is increased
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  Introduction
In the analysis of independent private value auctions it is a common exercise to
compare equilibrium bidding in rst and secondprice auctions While truth
ful bidding is a 	weakly
 dominant strategy in secondprice auctions bidders
necessarily shade their bids below their valuations when they participate in
a rstprice auction Therefore switching from a second to a rstprice auc
tion leads to lower bidding However when the number of bidders is increased
the participants of a rstprice auction raise their bids which in turn reduces
the gap between the two equilibrium bidding rules
From rst and secondprice auctions one may extrapolate and design
third and higherprice auctions where the winner pays the thirdhighest bid
or more generally the kth highest bid for k   This raises the question can
one also extrapolate how equilibrium bidding changes when one moves from
second to third and higherprice auctions and when the number of bidders
is increased
The present paper solves equilibrium bid functions of third and higher
price auctions for a large class of distribution functions of bidders valuations
assuming the symmetric independent private values framework and risk neu
trality The solutions imply the following general properties of the kprice
auction for k  
 equilibrium bids exceed bidders valuations 	the opposite of shading

 moving to a higherprice auction leads to higher bidding 	equilibrium
bids increase in k

 equilibrium bids diminish when the number of bidders is increased
 moving to a higherprice auction tends to increase the variance of the
equilibrium price
These properties delineate a general pattern of how equilibrium bidding rules
change as we move from rst to second and higherprice auction all the
way to the nth price auction where the winner pays only the lowest bid
and they may explain the predominance of rstprice auctions
Thirdprice auctions were considered for the rst time by Kagel and Levin
 who solved the equilibriumbid function assuming uniformly distributed
valuations and who identied some further general properties but did not give
a general solution of equilibrium bid functions
Thirdprice auctions have been useful to test the predictive power of auc
tion theory in laboratory experiments 	see Kagel and Levin 

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 Preliminaries
The solution builds upon some generally known results that are briey sum
marized in this section after stating basic assumptions and notation It shows
how the indirect solution method introduced by Riley and Samuelson  is
useful to solve even relatively complicated auctions
Assumptions Consider a kprice auction where a single unit is sold to
n   k    risk neutral bidders This auction is characterized by three rules 

the item is awarded to the highest bidder 	ties are handled by some allocation
rule
 
 the winner pays the kth highest bid 
 only the winner pays
The analysis assumes the symmetric independent private values framework
From the sellers perspective 	and that of rival bidders
 buyers valuations
V
 
     V
n
are continuous iid random variables with distribution function
	cdf
 F 	v
 and density function 	pds
 f	v
 on the support  v v  
Bidders strategy is their bid function b
k
	v
   v R

 and participation
rule 
k
	v
   v  f g We characterize symmetric equilibria where each
bidder bids according to the same bid function b
 
k
	v
 and assume that all
bidders have an incentive to participate which is always the case when the
item is unconditionally awarded to the highest bidder
Bidders probability of winning is denoted by  and their 	ex ante
 expected
payment by E To avoid confusion random valuations are written in capital
and realizations in lowercase letters
Order statistics Order statistics are a useful tool for analyzing auctions
Arrange the n    iid random valuations V
 
 V

     V
n
in ascending order of
magnitude and write them as V
 
 V

     V
n
 The random variable
V
r
is called the rth order statistic 	r        n
 V
 
is the lowest
and V
n
the highest valuation
Order statistics are necessarily dependent because of the inequality rela
tionship between them and they are not identically distributed even when
the underlying V

s are iid random variables
The probability density 	pds
 of the rth order statistic V
r
is f
V
 r
	x
 
n
r nr
F 	x

r 
	  F 	x


nr
f	x
 And the conditional pds of V
r
 given
V
s
 v 	s  r
 is just the pds of V
r
in the smaller sample size 	s
 drawn
from the parent distribution truncated on the right at v 	see Theorem  in
David 
 Therefore for x  v
f
V
 r
jV
 s
v
	x
 
	s 

	r  
	s r  

f	x
F 	x

r 
	F 	v
 F 	x


sr 
F 	v

s 

	

This result will be used repeatedly
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Basic results All auctions that award the item to the highest bidder are pay
o equivalent give rise to the same allocation rule and exhibit strict monotone
increasing equilibrium bid functions 	see Riley and Samuelson  and My
erson 
 In particular they all share the same equilibrium probability of
winning and the same equilibrium expected payments which are summarized
below
Proposition  RileySamuelson  Consider auctions that award
the item to the highest bidder In equilibrium the probability of winning 
 
	v

and ex ante expected payments E
 
	v
 are

 
	v
  PrfV
n 
 vg  F 	v

n 
	

E
 
	v
  vF 	v

n 

Z
v

F 	x

n 
dx 	

The equilibrium expected payment has an appealing interpretation
Proposition  Expected payment The conditional equilibrium expected
payment conditional upon winning is equal to the conditional expected value
of the second highest valuation EV
n 
j V
n
 v
E
 
	v
  
 
	vn
EV
n 
j V
n
 v 	


Z
v

x	n 
F 	x

n
f	x
dx 	

Proof By 	
 one has
E
 
	v
  xF 	x

n 



xv
x

Z
v

F 	x

n 
dx 	


Z
v

x	n 
F 	x

n
f	x
dx 	

Utilizing 	
 it follows immediately that the latter is equal to 
 
	vn
EV
n 
j
V
n
 v 
R
v

xf
V
 n 
jV
 n
v
	x
dx
For simple but complete proofs of these and other basic results of auction
theory consult the extensive survey by Wolfstetter 
 Equilibrium Bid Functions
Proposition 	 Third
price auction Consider the thirdprice auction where
the highest bidder wins and pays only	 the third highest bid and assume the
probability distribution function F is logconcave Then the equilibrium bid
function is
b
 
	
	v
  v  
F 	v

	n 
f	v

rd price auction  	
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Proof In a thirdprice auction one has
E
 
	v
  
 
	vn
Eb
 
	
	V
n

 j V
n
 v
 
 
	vn

Z
v

b
 
	
	x
f
V
 n 
jV
 n
v
	x
dx
 	n 
	n  

Z
v

b
 
	
	x
F 	x

n	
	F 	v
 F 	x

f	x
dx 	

Use 	
 from Proposition  and one has for all v
Z
v

xF 	x

n
f	x
dx  	n 

Z
v

b
 
	
	x
F 	x

n	
	F 	v
 F 	x

f	x
dx
	

Twice dierentiate this identity with respect to v rearrange and one ob
tains the asserted equilibrium bid function
This derivation assumes that the equilibrium bid function is strict mono
tone increasing in v The assumed logconcavity
 
of F entails that
F v
fv
is
increasing which assures that the equilibrium bid function is indeed increas
ing
Proposition  Generalization Consider the kprice auction where the
highest bidder wins and pays only	 the kth highest bid k  f      ng
and assume F is logconcave Then the equilibrium bid function is
b
 
k
	v
  v  
k  
n k  
F 	v

f	v

kprice auction 	

Proof In a kprice auction one has E
 
	v
  
 
	vn
Eb
 
k
	V
nk 

 j V
n
 v
By a procedure similar to the above one arrives at the following identity in v
Z
v

x	n 
F 	x

n
f	x
dx  	

Z
v

b
 
k
	x

	n 

	n k
	k  

f	x
F 	x

nk
	F 	v
 F 	x


k
dx 	

Dierentiate this identity 	k  
times dividing by f	v
 after each round
of dierentiation 	including the last
 Then one obtains for the righthand
side 	RHS
 of 	

RHS  b
 
k
	v

	n 

	n k

F 	v

nk
 	

 
A function F is logconcave if lnF  is concave Log concavity is frequently assumed in
information economics and it is assured by all standard distribution functions see Bagnoli
and Bergstrom 
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To apply the same procedure to the lefthand side 	LHS
 of 	
 is more te
dious Using the product rule of dierentiation 	g	x
h	x


n

P
n


n
r

g
r
	x
h
nr
	x

and the rule for the rth derivative of the polynomial 	x
  x
n
 
r
	x
 
r

n
r

x
nr
 one obtains after some rearranging
LHS 
	n 

	n k

F 	v

nk

v  
k  
n k  
F 	v

f	v


 	

Equate RHS and LHS and one has the asserted bid function The assumed
montonicity is again assured by the logconcavity of F 
From these results the properties of the kprice auction postulated in the
introduction follow immediately
Example  KagelLevin 	 If valuations are uniformly distributed
on the support   one has b
 
k
	v
 
n 
nk 
v as in Kagel and Levin Inci

dentally in this case b
 
k
	v
 covers all considered auctions  from the rst
price auction where bidders bid a fraction of their valuation b
 
 
	v
 
n 
n
v
to the nth price auction where bidders bid 	n  
 times their valuation
b
 
n
	v
  	n 
v
Remark  In the case of a uniform distribution of valuations it is easy to see
that the variance of the random equilibrium price P
k
tends to increase in k
since
Var	P
k

  Var

b
 
k
	V
nk 




k	n 

	n k  
	n 


	n  



	

This suggests that the seller nds second third and higherprice auctions
unappealing in terms of risk which may explain the prevalence of rstprice
auctions
 Conclusions
Third and higher price auctions have four striking properties 
 bids are
higher than the own valuation 
 equilibrium bids increase when one moves to
a higherprice auction 
 equilibrium bids diminish as the number of bidders
is increased and 
 the riskiness of the random equilibrium price tends to
increase as one moves to higherprice auctions
Once one has gured out why it pays to speculate and bid higher than
ones own valuation it is easy to interpret the third property Just keep in
mind that a rational bidder may get burned and suer a loss because the
kth highest bid is above the own valuation As the number of bidders is
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increased it becomes more likely that the kth highest bid is in close vicinity
to the own valuation Therefore it makes sense to bid more conservatively
when the number of bidders is increased
Finally the fourth property suggests that a risk averse seller should always
prefer lower order kprice auctions and should most prefer the rstprice
auction While the secondprice auction is always appealing because of its
overwhelming strategic simplicity third and higherprice auctions are strate
gically just as complicated as the rstprice auction but in addition expose
the seller to unnecessary risk
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